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1Nonprofit arts and cultural organizations have taken advantage 
of opportunities to acquire free and low-cost facilities – “$1 
buildings” – for decades. These projects occur in communities 
across the country and reflect a range of facilities and 
deal structures. While $1 buildings have not been studied 
comprehensively, anecdotal experience indicates that 
outcomes vary greatly.
The Kresge Foundation’s Arts and Culture Program has 
participated in and observed $1 building deals through its work 
related to capitalization and financial sustainability, as well as 
community revitalization and creative placemaking. Given the 
recurrence of these projects, the Foundation commissioned 
TDC1 to undertake a study of $1 buildings with the goal of 
improving the sector’s understanding of these deals.
For arts organizations, the appeal of space is strong. 
Facilities are central to fulfilling their missions and often 
to their identities. Buildings serve as functional spaces to 
create, exhibit, and perform art, and as gathering places for 
audiences to engage in cultural experiences. Facilities with 
impressive acoustics or rich natural lighting can enhance 
audiences’ listening or viewing experiences, while historic 
or innovative buildings can lend new dimensions to the art. 
Over time facilities can come to symbolize their inhabitants’ 
art and missions, and assume important roles in surrounding 
communities. Some leaders also view buildings as markers of 
legitimacy and staying power.
One way in which arts organizations have acquired space 
of their own is by taking advantage of $1 buildings. For the 
purposes of this report, $1 buildings include facilities that were 
given to arts organizations for free, sold for $1 or significantly 
under market-rate, or leased for $1/year.
Many $1 buildings share essential characteristics. They are 
often former public spaces that are no longer used for their 
original purposes. While these facilities are rarely viable 
properties in the marketplace, they often have rich histories 
and are valued as community assets. As the original owners 
divest, they often explore creative strategies to revive the 
buildings and invest in local communities. By nature, these 
projects are highly visible and involve an array of stakeholders 
with ambitious and diverse goals.
This report reflects on 17 arts organizations’ experiences with 
$1 buildings. It shares their lessons about how best to assess, 
prepare for, and structure these opportunities in order to 
achieve positive outcomes for arts and cultural organizations, 
funders, and communities. At the highest level, this report asks:
 How are $1 buildings different from other cultural facilities 
projects?
 How do the original building owners, funders, and arts 
organizations’ motivations for these deals differ, and how do 
their expectations change over time? What roles do these 
stakeholders play in acquisition?
 For organizations that acquire $1 buildings, what are the 
true costs and how are those costs funded? 
 What are the short- and long-term impacts of $1 building 
acquisition on organizations’ missions, financial health, and 
the surrounding communities?
Three striking findings emerged from this research. First, 
the stakeholders in these $1 building deals had different 
motivations for involvement. Original building owners, public 
and private funders, and community stakeholders were 
motivated by community impact. In contrast, arts organizations 
were swayed by the appeal of “a great bargain” and the 
opportunity to accelerate their art. Stakeholders rarely 
discussed their motivations upfront, and ultimately community 
impact was not a top priority for most arts organizations.
Second, this report debunks of the myth of the $1 building. For 
the arts and cultural organizations in this study, the short- and 
long-term costs of acquiring $1 buildings were significant, and 
often much larger than expected. In fact, these $1 buildings 
resembled more traditional facilities projects – they were 
expensive propositions that required rigorous upfront evaluation 
and planning. Yet these projects were often undertaken without 
significant planning. As a result, organizations acquired $1 
buildings without a clear understanding of their financial needs 
or a constellation of supporters in place to fund those needs 
over the long-term. For these organizations, the $1 building 
has proved to be a conundrum. Organizations experienced 
many of the benefits associated with facility acquisition, but at 
incredible cost. Several decades after acquisition, many are still 
working to attain financial sustainability. 
Introduction
1  TDC is one of the nation’s oldest nonprofit management consulting and research firms. TDC works exclusively with nonprofit, governmental, educational 
and philanthropic organizations, providing them with the business and management tools critical to achieving mission success.
2Third, these projects sparked significant organizational change. 
As these arts groups took on the responsibility of facilities, 
they shifted away from operating models dependent on sweat 
equity and professionalized. These shifts not only had financial 
implications, but also impacted organizations’ cultures and, in 
some cases, art and audiences.
This report reinforces prior research on cultural facilities. 
This study found that $1 building acquisition requires 
rigorous upfront planning, and that arts organizations 
acquiring $1 buildings do not tend to follow planning 
processes recommended for market-rate facilities projects, 
despite the need to do so. Prior research work has detailed 
recommendations on planning for cultural facilities, including 
the Nonprofit Finance Fund’s (NFF) Nonprofit Cultural Facilities 
Study 2 and the Cultural Policy Center at the University of 
Chicago’s Set in Stone report.3 
This study of $1 buildings comes at an opportune moment 
in light of the continued occurrence of these projects, and 
public and private funders’ focus on creative placemaking 
in communities of need. The Kresge Foundation and TDC 
hope that this report will provide guidance to all stakeholders 
involved in these deals and inspire more rigorous assessment 
of $1 building opportunities. We expect a potential outcome of 
increased assessment and planning to be fewer and stronger 
$1 building deals. 
A note of thanks
This study was made possible by the generosity of the 
nonprofit leaders and funders TDC interviewed, who 
shared their stories and the lessons they learned from 
their experiences with $1 buildings. The findings presented 
throughout this report summarize these leaders’ accounts and 
insights, all of which were imparted with the goal of providing 
thoughtful guidance to the field at large. All findings are 
reflected anonymously throughout the report.
 
2  NFF’s work examines arts facilities broadly, pointing out the opportunities and chronic pitfalls of these arrangements, and highlighting ways in which 
organizations and funders can reduce risk in order to capitalize on opportunities. Vincent, Christine, Jennifer R. Graves, Thomas B. Harris, Cheryl Kartes, 
Clara Miller, and Mark Weinheimer. “Nonprofit Cultural Facilities Study.” New York: Nonprofit Finance Fund, 1994. Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.
scribd.com/doc/69171445/NFF-Cultural-Facilities-Study-1994.
3  The Set in Stone report documents the rise of cultural facilities projects nation-wide, and observes that these arrangements are complex and highly 
specific to the organizations and communities involved. Woronkowicz, Joanna, Carroll Joynes, Peter Frumkin, Anastasia Kolendo, Bruce Seaman, Robert 
Gertner, and Norman Bradburn. “Set in Stone: Building America’s New Generation of Arts Facilities, 1994-2008.” Chicago: University of Chicago, 2012. 
Accessed April 1, 2015. culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/setinstone.
3Report Findings
 As noted earlier, the short- and long-term costs of acquiring 
$1 buildings were significant, and often much larger than 
organizations expected.
 Facilities required significant upfront investments to address 
accumulated maintenance needs and align organizations’ 
programs and spaces.
 Acquisition also compelled growth in budget size, driven 
by new facility-related expenses and investments in staff, 
programs, and infrastructure.
 As organizations took on the responsibility of facilities, 
they shifted away from operating models dependent 
on sweat equity and incurred costs associated with 
professionalization.
 These shifts away from sweat equity also impacted 
organizations’ cultures and, in some cases, the art itself.
 How to fund these costs remains an open question for 
organizations. Most organizations did not begin these 
projects with networks of supporters invested in the long-
term financial outcomes. Organizations pursued many 
different sources of funding, but were “walking a tightrope” 
of financial health.
Part IV – The Outcomes of Acquisition – summarizes the 
mission-based and financial results of acquisition, and these 
deals’ impacts on communities. 
 $1 building deals resulted in a diversity of outcomes. 
 Organizations experienced tangible and intangible mission-
based outcomes that are often associated with facilities 
projects, some of which were challenging to quantify. These 
included increased scale of impact, added programs and 
services, enhanced artistic quality, and increased visibility. 
 Community-based outcomes were difficult to quantify and 
often not organizations’ first priorities. However, some 
organizations noted progress that aligned with original 
owners’ and funders’ goals for community-level impact.
 These outcomes came at a high cost. Only four of the 17 
organizations participating in this study exhibited strong 
financial health. In general, the elevated costs associated 
with facility acquisition stressed organizations’ business 
models, causing anxiety about the future.
 Three factors appear to differentiate the organizations with 
more positive outcomes. Organizations with strong financial 
health and networks of support prior to acquisition were 
more likely to experience positive outcomes. Those that 
addressed deferred maintenance in a timely manner were 
also more likely to achieve positive results.
In light of the many challenges associated with $1 buildings, 
this report concludes with lessons for organizations, funders, 
and community stakeholders to assess, prepare for, and 
structure $1 building opportunities.
The following summary outlines the key findings for each 
section of this report. 
Part I of this report – The Singularity of the $1 Building 
– examines what distinguishes $1 buildings from their 
market-rate counterparts, including the motivations that drove 
original building owners, private and public funders, and arts 
organizations to become involved.
 The $1 buildings tended to be old, large, public spaces built for 
specific purposes and located in low-income neighborhoods.
 The buildings typically required large-scale renovation work 
to ensure they were functional.
 Communities had strong attachments to these spaces and 
their histories, and were invested in their futures.
 The primary stakeholders had different motivations for 
involvement in $1 building deals. The tension between  
these different motivations is present in the deals explored 
in this study.
 Original building owners, and private and public funders, 
were driven by goals for community-level impact. In contrast, 
arts organizations acted opportunistically when presented 
with offers so good “[they] couldn’t say no.” Their excitement 
was driven by the potential to increase organizational 
impact and accelerate their art, and not by the prospect of 
community-level impact.
Part II – The Acquisition Decision – examines common 
characteristics of arts organizations’ decisions to acquire  
$1 buildings, and organizations’ and funders’ reflections on 
these processes.
 Arts organizations rarely conducted upfront evaluation and 
planning before acquiring $1 buildings. In many cases this 
led to surprises regarding buildings’ conditions and the long-
term costs of ownership. 
 Excitement and opportunism inhibited organizations from 
conducting due diligence. Rapid acquisition timelines, 
internal capacity challenges, and lack of expertise and 
financial resources acted as further barriers to planning.
 $1 building deal structures were highly situational and  
often complex.
 Original owners rarely invested in the facilities before turning 
them over to arts organizations. 
 Original owners frequently determined the deal terms.
Part III – The Costs of Acquisition – debunks the myth of 
the $1 building by laying out the true costs associated with 
facility acquisition for these arts organizations. This section also 
summarizes organizations’ strategies to fund these costs.
4TDC studied a group of 17 nonprofit arts organizations  
with $1 buildings. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of study 
participants by the characteristics of their $1 building  
funding arrangements.4
The 17 organizations included in this study were recommended 
by private and public funders across the country, and vetted by 
TDC to ensure they met the study’s criteria. Study participants 
represent a range of disciplines, geographic regions, and dates 
of facility acquisition (Figures 2-4).5 The sample is weighted 
towards small and mid-sized institutions, reflecting how smaller 
organizations often take on these projects (Figure 5).
Arts organizations: interviews and financial research
In total, TDC interviewed 27 leaders from these nonprofit 
organizations. Participants included current staff leadership at 
each organization, and in some cases the board members, 
founders, artistic staff, and funders involved in these  
facility transactions.
To augment the interview findings, TDC analyzed five years 
(FY 2009-2013) of audited financials or Form 990s to assess 
organizations’ current financial health and facility-related costs.
Public and private funder interviews
TDC also interviewed 20 private and public funders from across 
the country to gather their insights and recommendations for 
the field. Interviewees included:
 Public funders directly involved in $1 building transactions 
(in many cases these were the buildings’ original owners)
 Consultants to $1 building transactions
 Private foundation funders with general knowledge of $1 
building deals
As this report highlights, the deals examined in this study 
varied greatly in structure and outcome. Facility projects 
were contingent on nonprofits’ organizational characteristics 
and financial health, deal structures, neighborhoods, funding 
markets, and the facilities themselves. Given this complexity 
and the size of the sample, this study aims to capture individual 
organizations’ unique stories while also identifying the larger 
lessons that staff, board leadership, and funders can apply to 
these opportunities in the future.
Figure 1. Study participants by funding arrangement 
Funding 
arrangement
Cost of 
facility
Original owner Orgs %
Nonprofit 
owns
$1 City 5 29%
$1 Corporation 2 12%
Low-cost Private owners 2 12%
Nonprofit 
leases
$1/year City 7 41%
$1/year State 1 6%
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Figure 2. Discipline of study participants
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4  Two study participants noted that they acquired buildings for significantly under market-rate from private owners but no longer have records  
of the transactions.
5  Figures 2 through 6 are based on 17 study participants.
Figure 4. Geographic location of study participants
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5Part I summarizes the tangible and intangible ways in which 
$1 buildings differ from their market-rate counterparts. 
This section begins by describing the facilities themselves, 
including their physical characteristics, histories, and roles in 
surrounding communities. It next examines the elements that 
motivated buildings’ original owners to initiate these deals, and 
funders and arts organizations to become involved.
Characteristics of the $1 building
The $1 buildings acquired by study participants varied in their 
histories and physical characteristics, but also shared attributes 
that shaped the nature of these opportunities. Three quarters 
were old municipal buildings, including schools, performing 
arts facilities, a museum, and a firehouse. The remainder, 
all privately-owned buildings, included a theatre, a church, a 
factory, and a former YWCA. The majority of these buildings 
were old: eight were constructed more than a century ago 
and only two were built within the last 25 years. The facilities 
ranged in size from small 5,000 square foot spaces to massive 
buildings upwards of 90,000 square feet; half of the study 
participants acquired facilities larger than 40,000 square feet 
(Figure 6). Three quarters of these buildings were located in 
low-income neighborhoods, some of which more recently 
experienced gentrification.
Given their original purposes and often distinguished histories, 
the majority of these buildings had stature in surrounding 
communities. Most had high-profile pasts as institutions that 
served the general public, and were recognized and valued 
as community assets by neighborhood residents. More than 
half of study participants described their spaces as historically 
significant, citing their buildings’ architectural features, 
famous architects, or notable histories. Residents and other 
stakeholders often had strong emotional ties to these facilities 
and their stories, and community awareness and expectations 
tended to be high.
The slant towards older, larger, public spaces located in low-
income neighborhoods impacted the opportunities presented to 
study participants in two primary ways.
 Facilities had significant maintenance needs. Given 
their age and size, most of these buildings were in poor 
condition when they were acquired by arts organizations. 
Eight of the 17 were vacant and had been neglected for 
significant periods of time prior to acquisition. As a result, 
these spaces required substantial work to ensure they were 
functional, including structural repairs, replacement of old 
systems, and the addition of basic functional features such 
as climate control, plumbing, and handicap accessibility. 
 Buildings were not purpose-built to meet arts 
organizations’ needs. The buildings in this sample were 
often designed for alternate purposes and therefore not 
equipped to meet organizations’ artistic and programmatic 
needs. In three cases theatre companies acquired old 
theatre spaces, but even these buildings required extensive 
work to meet modern production requirements. Although 
renovations to align organizations’ programs and facilities 
could often be carried out in tandem with basic building 
repairs, they required additional expertise to design  
and execute.
Motivations for involvement
The three major players partnering in these deals – original 
building owners, private and public funders, and arts 
organizations – approached these arrangements with different 
motivations and goals for the future.
Original owners were often concerned about upholding 
buildings’ legacies. In most cases the facilities in question 
were no longer used to fulfill their original purposes, prompting 
their original owners to consider divestment options. The 
reasons for obsolescence varied – school districts consolidated 
or closed schools, theatres shut down, corporate headquarters 
moved, and cities constructed new state-of-the-art facilities 
to replace older buildings. In a few cases involving private 
owners, changes in surrounding neighborhoods contributed to 
decisions to vacate. As Figure 1 shows, 12 of these buildings 
were originally owned by city governments, one by a state 
government, two by corporations, and two by private owners. 
These facilities’ profiles made them difficult to sell at market-
rate. Their lack of market viability prompted three owners to 
initiate plans for demolition. The remainder either left their 
buildings vacant or sought new inhabitants.
Part I: The Singularity of the $1 Building
Figure 6. Study participants by square footage 
of $1 building
<10,000
sq. ft.
12%
>40,000 sq. ft.
50% 10,000–40,000
sq. ft.
38%
6While the majority of original building owners had financial 
incentives to divest these spaces, they were also motivated by 
broader interests in reanimating these historically significant 
facilities and upholding their legacies of community impact. 
Public owners especially had civic goals for these buildings’ 
futures. In four cases government agencies focused on 
neighborhood revitalization helped building owners find 
new tenants that would add cultural vibrancy to low-income 
communities. One corporate owner made revitalization a 
priority after purchasing a full block for its offices.
Public and private funders’ involvement was driven 
by interest in community-level impacts. In the case of 
buildings originally owned by city or state governments, the 
owners often became funders of the deals as well. Many of 
these funders articulated desires to encourage economic 
development, revitalize communities, and promote cultural 
vitality, observing that communities “will benefit from the 
presence of vibrant arts organizations.” A public funder 
encouraged peers not to lose sight of these wider impacts: 
“there is often the imperative to maximize city revenue from 
vacant properties, but there is tremendous value in a site 
becoming an arts nonprofit for both economic drivers and 
community impact.” Funders’ secondary goals also had 
broader civic implications, including promoting high quality  
arts and culture, encouraging cultural equity, and saving 
historic buildings. 
Most arts organizations were not looking for space, 
but the offers were so good “[they] couldn’t say no.” 
The majority of study participants were not actively looking 
for facilities when they learned about these $1 building 
opportunities. Instead, arts leaders reported that they were 
approached by the original property owners or had happened 
upon opportunities. In five cases building owners (in most 
cases city funders) issued RFPs inviting nonprofits to submit 
plans detailing how they would use these spaces. In another 
four cases leaders first got word of these opportunities through 
stakeholders’ social and professional networks. In two cases 
the vacant buildings themselves attracted leaders’ attention, 
prompting them to seek out owners. The few groups that were 
actively looking for space noted aspirations to grow their scale 
and impact, improve their art, secure homes, and acquire 
spaces in specific neighborhoods.
Leaders repeatedly described the opportunities to acquire 
discounted space as “great bargain[s],” noting that mindsets of 
“idealism,” “wild optimism,” “opportunism,” and “excitement” 
pushed staff and board leaders to see buildings that others 
did not want as exciting opportunities. The executive director 
of a small art gallery reflected many leaders’ recollections 
of acquisition: “[it was] all very idealistic and democratic…
we were starry-eyed about the potential and didn’t think 
too carefully about the practicalities.” Funders connected 
organizations’ excitement to the perception that facility 
acquisition is “a sign you’ve made it.” Many of the study 
participants were small organizations, and accustomed to 
relying on free and discounted goods and services to carry out 
their work. This culture may have predisposed organizations 
to view the $1 building offer as yet another opportunity to 
capitalize on a good deal. 
7While the specific circumstances of acquisition differed 
for study participants, arts organizations’ decision-making 
processes shared characteristics that suggest broader lessons 
for the sector. Part II first describes organizations’ decisions 
to move forward with acquisition and the characteristics of 
decision-making that may have inhibited upfront due diligence. 
Next, it profiles the nature of the deals themselves – who 
was involved and what the $1 building arrangements looked 
like. The section concludes with organizations’ and funders’ 
reflections on these processes.
Planning ahead
Leaders’ decisions to acquire $1 buildings were highly specific, 
set in the context of time, place, and organizational priorities. 
However, almost all study participants voiced regrets that they 
did not conduct more rigorous upfront evaluation and planning 
to inform their decisions. Interviewees described entering 
these deals without comprehensive knowledge of the buildings 
themselves, or the short- and long-term financial implications 
of acquisition. Participants were subsequently surprised by 
elements of their new spaces and the extent of repair work 
required. One group realized post-acquisition that its facility 
did not comply with building codes because it had no sprinkler 
system; another was shocked to find its space filled with waste 
and run-down equipment from a prior inhabitant. The executive 
director of a community arts center reflected on how a lack of 
planning intensified the staff’s sense that “[the building] is a 
big black hole” for resources, with problems and associated 
expenses surfacing at every turn.
In their descriptions of the acquisition process, leaders 
highlighted common characteristics of decision-making that 
inhibited the rigorous upfront evaluation they recommended  
in hindsight.
 Opportunistic mindset. Study participants described 
how the excitement and idealism surrounding these deals 
distracted staff and board leaders from conducting rigorous 
upfront due diligence. Funders echoed this sentiment, 
observing that the “immediate response is to take it.” Even 
the few organizations actively seeking space reflected that 
they were swayed by opportunism when presented with 
low-cost options. Excited at the prospect of free space, an 
arts education organization with an $800,000 operating 
budget moved forward with a $1/year rental agreement on a 
40,000 square foot former school building despite the space 
being “bigger than we needed.” Several other participants 
described how they overlooked the scale of maintenance 
needs for the same reason, one leader noting in retrospect 
that without planning “we weren’t able to grasp the level  
of decrepitude” and instead focused on “the building’s  
high potential.” 
 Rapid timelines. Study participants observed that timelines 
for acquisition were often fast and outside of their control. 
Three participants acquired buildings slated for demolition, 
prompting them to move quickly before the buildings were 
destroyed. Leaders from one of these organizations noted 
that “our lack of understanding was largely because the 
deal came together rapidly…the timing didn’t allow us to 
truly visualize the amount of work it would take.” Other 
organizations were beholden to public-funders’ timelines for 
RFP processes.
 Lack of facility expertise. Organizations noted that 
their staff and board members often lacked experience in 
real estate, construction, law, and business – all areas of 
expertise critical to overseeing facility-related processes. 
Study participants described their boards at the time of 
acquisition as “young and fledgling,” and “comprised of 
artists and students, not bankers and lawyers.” Some 
organizations invested in consultants and other outside 
experts, but many lacked the funds and/or awareness 
to do so. In a few instances, private and public funders, 
many of whom cited lack of expertise as a chronic problem 
during acquisition, paid for upfront work with architects, 
contractors, and consultants.
 Lack of staff capacity. Five organizations did not have 
full-time staff at the time of acquisition, and most other 
participants were stretched thin during this period. At the 
smallest organizations, boards often drove the decision-
making and acquisition processes. 
 Lack of access to financial resources. Many 
organizations cited lack of financial resources as a barrier 
to planning at this initial stage. Rapid timelines and a lack 
of staff capacity exacerbated the difficulties of fundraising 
for these added expenses. As noted above, some funders 
supported planning work, citing it as their responsibility  
to help prepare organizations for acquisition. Other  
funders felt differently, one stating “it’s not our job to  
police organizations, they need to take care of their due 
diligence themselves.” 
The deal
These $1 buildings opportunities resulted in a variety of deal 
structures. Nine of the 17 study participants currently own their 
facilities and eight have long-term lease agreements for $1/
year (Figure 1). Close to half of these deals have been in place 
for more than 25 years, many of them government-supported 
arrangements with goals to enhance municipalities’ cultural 
vibrancy (Figure 3). Four of the participating organizations 
were first established to inhabit divested spaces – three by city 
governments eager to fill vacant public facilities, and one by 
community residents committed to reviving an abandoned  
city building.
Part II: The Acquisition Decision
8Study participants’ accounts of these deals highlighted two 
common characteristics:
 Original owners rarely invested in facilities before 
turning them over to arts organizations. Only two 
original building owners overhauled facilities to ensure they 
were in working condition prior to transferring ownership. As 
such, the financial burden of renovating these spaces rested 
almost entirely with arts organizations. 
 Facilities’ original owners controlled the deal terms, 
with little negotiation from arts organizations. Study 
participants described how, by and large, original property 
owners dictated lease and ownership terms. In many cases, 
board and staff leadership had little to no experience with 
property transactions and did not negotiate for better terms. 
Organizations that had not conducted upfront planning 
were often unprepared for negotiations and unsure what to 
request. A founding board member of one small organization 
recalled how, “we were mystified as to why another 
organization [bidding for the same space] asked for funding 
in addition to the building…we felt like we were already 
getting so much.” Organizations that were more successful 
in negotiating funding observed that upfront planning 
allowed them to leverage documentation of their facility’s 
condition and quantify the financial resources needed for 
renovations and long-term maintenance.
In hindsight: “Be careful of gift horses”
Study participants’ accounts of these $1 building opportunities 
shed light on the emotion and idealism that often surrounds 
these transactions. Participants described how staff and board 
leaders were often caught up in the moment, focused on the 
“great deal,” the building’s future potential, and the appeal of a 
place to call their own.
Leaders acknowledged that aspiration and excitement 
are critical components of any facility deal; without them 
organizations would lack the commitment and drive to see 
these arrangements through to completion. However, both 
organizations and funders observed that opportunism can be a 
dangerous mindset. They described how this mentality diverted 
attention away from upfront evaluation of the business case, 
and biased leaders towards moving forward. As one funder 
commented, “we see a lot of leaders making decisions for the 
wrong reasons.” 
In hindsight almost all organizations and funders recommended 
conducting rigorous due diligence upfront to avoid the traps of 
an opportunistic mindset. Participants reflected on the ways in 
which conducting planning – specifically facility assessments, 
strategic business planning, and fundraising feasibility studies 
– could have informed their board and staff decision-making by 
helping leaders to:
 Understand organizations’ current states – their financial 
health, networks of support, and overall levels of readiness 
to take on a facility;
 Assess the needs of the facilities, including accumulated 
maintenance needs, the renovations required to align their 
space and programs, and the costs of ongoing upkeep;
 Map the full financial implications of these projects and 
test whether financial support exists to fund the necessary 
investments, both initially and over time;
 Educate internal and external stakeholders on the risks and 
opportunities associated with facility acquisition.
Study participants also advised that organizations carefully 
select decision-making teams that reflect a variety of 
perspectives, with key members prepared to play the role 
of “devil’s advocate.” In this way organizations can test 
assumptions and the soundness of all decisions being made.
9In Part III, study participants debunk the myth of the $1 building 
by illuminating the true costs associated with acquiring these 
facilities. The first section outlines these costs, including the 
up-front expense of renovation as well as the longer-term costs 
that accompany shifts in organizations’ operating models. 
The second section reviews the ways in which organizations 
funded these expenses, and compares organizations’ original 
assumptions for these revenue streams with their actual 
experiences. 
While many of the findings presented in this section apply 
to facility acquisition at any cost, these conclusions take on 
new significance in light of the finding that most organizations 
pursue $1 building deals with little upfront planning.
The cost of the “low-cost” building
As discussed in Part I, organizations in the acquisition 
phase were swayed by the appeal of the “great opportunity” 
to secure space to carry out their missions for essentially 
nothing. Yet in the long-term, these discounted propositions 
had significant associated costs. These included the upfront 
costs of renovating facilities to align with programs and 
address accumulated maintenance, the ongoing annual 
expense of operating and maintaining buildings, and perhaps 
most surprisingly the costs of organizational growth and 
professionalization.
Cost of renovation. As discussed, almost all of the $1 
buildings acquired in this study were in poor condition and 
unequipped to meet organizations’ artistic needs prior to 
acquisition – “if a building’s free there’s likely something wrong 
with it,” one interviewee noted. With the exception of two 
participants with city-renovated buildings, every organization 
had to address substantial accumulated maintenance brought 
on by years of neglected repairs, referred to as deferred 
maintenance throughout the remainder of this report. In 
the cases in which costs were assessed upfront they were 
staggeringly large, often many times organizations’ annual 
operating budgets. 
To fund and execute the renovations necessary to take care  
of deferred maintenance, study participants took three  
different approaches:
 All at once. Five organizations raised funds to address 
deferred maintenance and align their spaces and programs 
in one fell swoop – “there’s momentum to a campaign when 
you raise it all at once,” one interviewee noted.
 Over time. In contrast, six groups made gradual repairs 
and updates to their buildings over time. Of this group, two 
have fully addressed their deferred maintenance and artistic 
needs; the other four are still working towards their goals.
 Deferred. The last group of four organizations has made 
little to no progress dealing with deferred maintenance or 
developing artistically suitable spaces, instead responding to 
facility needs as crises arise. 
Budget growth is non-negotiable. Every organization that 
existed prior to taking on a $1 building grew in budget size 
following acquisition. In most cases growth was significant; 
65% of participants’ budgets more than doubled in size over 
the last 15 years, and six groups more than tripled. Growth for 
small and mid-sized organizations was especially dramatic. 
For most organizations this growth was unplanned, beginning 
organically and becoming increasingly strategic over time. A 
small theatre reflected: “at first we were just trying to keep up, 
but now we’re thinking about who we want to be and how to 
get there.” 
Across the sample, the most significant driver of budget 
growth was staff investments. The organizations that existed 
prior to acquisition lacked the human resources to care and 
fundraise for a facility. Approximately half added development 
staff to ramp up fundraising to cover the costs of maintenance 
and renovations. A number also added facility-specific staff, 
including operations, maintenance, and security personnel. In 
a few cases investments were made in program staff, most 
frequently in front-line roles.
In addition to growth in staff, organizations had to cover the 
expenses of running and maintaining facilities, including 
the costs of utilities, insurance, and basic maintenance. 
On average, study participants spent 4% of their operating 
budgets on annual maintenance between FY09 and FY13. The 
groups spending the most annually, around 8%-9%, inhabited 
large buildings (>50,000 square feet). Six participants, 
all of whom described their organizations as financially 
weak, explicitly stated that annual maintenance costs were 
unmanageable. Programming their new spaces also required 
investment, although these costs were not as significant.
Part III: The Costs of Acquisition 
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Looking ahead, half of the study participants voiced a desire 
to continue growing; only three expressed that they were 
satisfied with their current scale. Those that hoped to grow 
articulated that they had not yet achieved their ideal size, 
some implying the assumption “if we could only get to 
scale, our financial problems would be solved.”6 Participants 
articulated a number of future goals that would contribute to 
budget growth, including additional increases to staff, funding 
for annual maintenance, and investments in programs. Two 
organizations that scaled up quickly over the last decade are 
considering acquiring additional space to further expand their 
programmatic reach.
The unavoidable growth that accompanied $1 building facility 
acquisition stressed organizations’ existing operating models, 
requiring that they find new and larger sources of revenue. 
Many study participants “didn’t realize how expensive of a 
proposition it was” and had to deal with the ramifications of 
costly surprises over time. As a result, interviewees again 
voiced regret that they had not conducted upfront planning to 
better prepare them for growth and its implications.
Acquisition “pushes organizations to grow up quickly.” 
Organizations and funders both observed that $1 building 
acquisition corresponded with professionalization. Pre-
building, study participants tended to be highly dependent on 
volunteer, pro-bono, and low-cost labor and services, referred 
to throughout this report as sweat equity. Before acquiring 
a building “we ran on collaboration, volunteers, and in-kind 
donations…we thought of ourselves as an organization that 
wasn’t represented on the 990,” reflected the executive 
director of a small theatre.
The entrenched ethic of ‘take anything we can get for free’ 
played a part in organizations’ decisions to move forward with 
$1 building deals. However, many participants professionalized 
after realizing that their sweat equity dependent models could 
not be scaled to meet the needs of larger, more complex 
organizations. Participants described how growth pulled staff 
members away from their artistic and programmatic work, 
often forcing them to take on facility-related responsibilities. 
In many cases the increased responsibility of a building also 
necessitated higher levels of efficiency and accountability 
than volunteer workers could offer. As one veteran interviewee 
explained, “a building is like a large, gluttonous child that 
increases your level of responsibility very quickly.” Acquisition 
“pushes organizations to grow up quickly, and in a different 
way than they would have grown up otherwise.” 
In addition to scaling up staff capacity, professionalization 
prompted the following organizational changes.
 Leadership. The need for new skill sets often prompted 
transitions in board and staff leadership. As one interviewee 
noted, “the building becomes its own organization, and the 
experience [of managing the building] is entirely different 
from running your existing organization.” A handful of 
participants brought on new staff leaders, often with 
administrative expertise, after realizing “the founder wasn’t 
the person for the job anymore.” Some organizations that 
were “administratively behind where [they] were artistically” 
moved towards dual leadership structures (one administrator 
and one artist) to ensure that there was expertise and 
focus on both dimensions. At the board level, organizations 
strategically moved away from boards consisting of friends 
and family towards carefully selected groups that provided 
needed expertise and access to resources.
 Culture. Shifts away from sweat equity led to an array of 
internal and external tensions. Some participants required 
time and mistakes to realize a new approach was needed. A 
small art gallery with no staff pre-building described how “it 
took many times of running fast into a wall with our heads 
down to realize the model we thought was realistic actually 
wasn’t.” Staff, board members, and volunteers often had 
a difficult time moving away from the mindset of ‘we do 
everything ourselves,’ especially when it came to facility-
related work. In addition, organizations had to reconcile 
internal and external stakeholders’ nostalgia for the “quirky,” 
“grassroots” feel of organizations’ pasts with the fact that 
“today [they’re] more businesslike.” Leaders from a small 
community theatre reflected: “we want to keep the organic 
connection with families, kids, and artists, but become more 
business-like and have a vision for the long-term rather than 
short-term future.”
 Art and audience. Professionalization also impacted the 
art itself, which in turn induced shifts in audiences. The 
executive director of a community theatre described how 
enhancements in artistic quality and professionalization 
corresponded with less spontaneity and a narrower range of 
offerings. The same leader explained how the theatre’s early 
audience, which was “young, bohemian, and adventurous,” 
contrasted with its current “older, wealthier” attendees. 
For some organizations these shifts happened relatively 
quickly, over the course of a few years. These study 
participants capitalized on the forward momentum of $1 
building acquisition and raised funds to cover the costs of 
professionalization – “we made one leap with the building, let’s 
make the next [by building up staff and infrastructure].” For 
others, professionalization took decades or is still in the works. 
Regardless of its pace, the transition away from sweat equity 
required candid conversations about organizations’ goals and 
operating models. 
6  Nelson, Susan, and Juliana Koo. Capitalization, Scale, and Investment: Does Growth Equal Gain? A Study of Philadelphia’s Arts and Culture Sector, 2007 to 
2011. Boston: TDC, 2014. 
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In many cases participants’ reliance on unpaid labor in 
the initial phase of acquisition was what allowed them to 
move ahead. However, one executive director reflected that 
sweat equity had proved both a blessing and a curse. While 
volunteers and under-paid staff allowed the organization to get 
its building into working condition and maintain its programs, 
it also “disguised actual need and obscured the fact that 
there are many things that cannot be done through sweat 
equity alone.” The embedded costs of running organizations, 
and now facilities, were not reflected on organizations’ 
financial statements. These costs were difficult to quantify 
and understand, and therefore to communicate to board, 
staff, and funders, all of whom make decisions based on their 
assumptions of organizations’ operating models. The same 
leader observed the dangerous assumption “that [sweat equity] 
will exist in perpetuity,” worrying that, if not demystified, this 
expectation would continue to impede the organization’s ability 
to raise financial support.
In summary, facility acquisition accelerated organizations’ 
budget growth and professionalization. As the next section 
describes, organizations then struggled to raise the funds 
necessary to address these needs. As a result, the majority 
of study participants still do not have the processes and 
structures in place to match their levels of responsibility post-
acquisition. As one theatre explained, “we have an 80 year 
legacy, but are like an eight year-old organization.”
Funding the “low-cost” building
As organizations grew, changed, and took on facility-related 
costs, they required new and expanded sources of support to 
meet their growing financial needs. Because study participants 
rarely quantified these costs prior to acquisition, most had to 
determine the level of funds needed and how to generate them 
on an ad hoc basis. One organization expressed surprise at 
having to raise money at all – “we thought we’d be rich when 
we got the building…and didn’t understand the building would 
be a massive shift in how we raise and invest money.” 
This section examines who paid for the upfront and ongoing 
costs of the $1 building, and whether organizations found a 
financial solution.
Public funders 
Public funders provided critical support, especially for capital 
projects, but rarely covered the full costs associated with 
facilities. Public funders were many study participants’ largest 
financial supporters, providing critical funding upfront as well 
as support for projects over time. While the levels of public 
funding varied significantly, this support fell into three broad 
categories: funds for upfront renovations, ongoing support for 
annual maintenance and operations, and one-time funding for 
capital projects. 
Public funds for upfront renovations. Ten of the 13 
participants with public buildings received upfront funding for 
renovations, although the scale of support varied significantly. 
In two cases government funders fully funded comprehensive 
facility renovations prior to arts organizations taking over 
the spaces. These overhauls addressed buildings’ deferred 
maintenance needs and aligned facilities with organizations’ 
missions.7 While one participant was thrilled with the work, the 
other reflected that “we did a really bad job of asserting our 
needs and thinking through what we would need to run our 
programs.” This organization has since begun raising money to 
reconstruct the layout of its space.
In the remaining cases, city and state funders provided some 
support for upfront renovations as part of their initial deal 
agreements or in the form of capital campaign contributions. 
For example, two study participants negotiated with public 
funders to cover costs associated with specific components of 
renovation such as the replacement of a boiler system. Given 
the scale of most participants’ deferred maintenance needs, 
this support covered only a fraction of renovation costs. 
Ongoing public support for annual maintenance  
and operations. Seven study participants (roughly half of 
those that acquired public buildings) received ongoing public 
support for annual maintenance and operations. However, 
with the exception of two groups occupying leased city-owned 
buildings, ongoing annual support did not cover the full  
costs of operating and maintaining these facilities. In some 
cases, leaders voiced concerns that these funds did  
not cover larger percentages of their facility-related costs. 
Study participants observed the following about their ongoing 
support agreements:
 Funding allocations were not grounded in actual 
facility costs. In some instances, funding allocations 
were not informed by estimates of actual facility costs. In 
others, ongoing costs were not accurately predicted by 
organizations, funders, or both parties.
 Initial agreements did not account for changes 
over time. In many cases, lease terms did not account 
for changes over time in expenses or strategies, or map 
out schedules for regular revision. In one instance, a city 
funder agreed to provide a mid-sized theatre occupying a 
city-owned building with $300,000 a year for maintenance. 
More than ten years later the organization was still receiving 
the same dollar amount from the city, significantly less with 
inflation taken into account.
7 In a third case the city funded a facility overhaul a decade after the arts organization took over the building.
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In many cases, but not all, agreements governing annual 
support were codified. In other instances lease terms were 
assumed and not recorded, leading to disagreements over 
time. One museum, a legacy facility deal established with 
a charter, has no documentation governing its current 
relationship with the city. This ambiguity has made it difficult 
for staff to negotiate with the city and to articulate a compelling 
value proposition for investment when fundraising. In two other 
instances, a lack of clarity in terms has led to long-standing 
disagreements over which party was responsible for the cost  
of utilities.
One-time public funding for capital projects. In just 
two cases, public funders assumed full responsibility 
for participants’ capital needs over time. Instead, most 
organizations took advantage of one-time funding for capital 
projects that could be accessed through grant application 
processes. This funding was available to all organizations, 
regardless of whether the original deal was with a public entity. 
Fourteen organizations took advantage of one-time support 
from city funders, and six organizations accessed one-time 
state support.8 Study participants leveraged this funding 
to cover the costs associated with replacing old systems, 
restoring historic facades, and bringing buildings up to code. 
Many organizations took advantage of opportunities for capital 
support more than once, applying for funds to cover a variety 
of projects.
While study participants were thankful to have access 
to funding for capital projects, they also reflected on the 
challenges associated with the timelines in place for securing 
this support. Grant deadlines and reimbursement policies for 
renovations rarely aligned with internal operating cycles and 
plans for construction, and organizations struggled to plan far 
enough in advance to take these timelines into consideration. 
Two participants noted that they took on debt to avoid  
cash flow challenges while they waited for public support  
to come through.
In their reflections on both one-time and ongoing public 
support, study participants frequently observed that revenue 
from public sources was tied to factors outside of their control 
that often prompted unexpected changes. Some organizations 
connected shifts in public support to changes in political 
administrations, which influenced public funders’ priorities and 
led to changes in city and state personnel. Others observed 
connections between shifts in public support and the health of 
the economy that affected funding available for the arts.
Few organizations had goals to increase public support. 
However, many of the study participants that had acquired 
public buildings expressed confidence that public funders 
would bail them out of future crises if necessary. This 
confidence stemmed in part from organizations’ beliefs that 
city/state funders have vested interests in seeing the arts 
organizations inhabiting divested public buildings succeed. One 
large civic institution stated that “the city has to be invested 
in our well-being or we will fail and the city will get the keys 
[to the building] back.” And indeed, public funders provided 
critical support in at least a few emergencies, twice extending 
organizations soft loans to avoid cash flow crises and in several 
cases funding emergency renovations on run-down facilities. 
Individual giving
Organizations had high hopes for individual giving, but few 
achieved their goals. While participants expressed initial 
optimism about the scale of funding they could raise from 
individuals, their expectations often waned with time. For most 
study participants, attracting donations from individuals was 
“an uphill battle.”
Study participants experienced a number of challenges 
associated with individual giving across the wider nonprofit 
sector. Organizations often had limited staff and financial 
resources to put towards donor cultivation and struggled to 
build boards with members able to provide high levels of 
financial support. In addition, the market for individual support 
was competitive. 
However, participants also described challenges associated 
with individual giving that were specific to $1 building 
acquisition.
 Donor perceptions of public support. Organizations 
with lease agreements struggled to raise money for their 
facilities. Those with city-owned buildings in particular ran 
up against public perceptions that “the city takes care of 
us.” 
 Facility-related funding. Participants noted that it was 
more difficult to raise funding for their facilities than for 
programs.
 Location/audience. A number of study participants 
own facilities in and serve communities with low-income 
populations. These organizations had to search further afield 
for major donors.
 Lack of vision. Organizations that didn’t plan how to use 
their spaces upfront had difficulty articulating their needs 
and visions for the future to donors. These study participants 
acknowledged that they often struggled to make compelling 
cases for investment.
Despite these challenges, participants continue to invest in 
growing individual support. Many plan to add numbers and 
expertise to their development staff, with the goal of increasing 
donor cultivation efforts. Organizations also articulated a focus 
8 Five of the six participants that took advantage of state funding for capital projects also received support from city funders.
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on board growth and development, in the hopes that recruiting 
wealthy, connected board members will open doors to new 
networks of support.
Earned revenue
Earned revenue grew for some, but wasn’t enough on its own. 
Approximately half of the 17 study participants expressed initial 
optimism about potential earned revenue gains. Performing 
arts organizations hoped to grow revenue from ticket sales; 
education organizations from class tuition; and community 
arts centers from a combination of tuition, events, and studio 
rentals. Leaders across disciplines had aggressive goals 
around space rentals.
However, participants noted that earned revenue rarely met 
their optimistic expectations, instead generating incremental 
gains that did not provide a scale of return commensurate with 
budget growth. Two thirds of study participants generated more 
income, but only five measurably increased the percentage 
of their budgets coming from earned sources over the last 
five years. Some participants noted that they had been overly 
optimistic in their rental projections – “[they] were much too 
high because we didn’t consider what limited time we would 
have to use the space for rentals.” Others overestimated 
revenue from ticket sales. Organizations also raised the 
question of return on investment given the staff time  
and resources it often took them to generate additional  
earned income.
Several participants noted tension between their earned revenue 
and artistic goals. The executive director of a small theatre 
expressed concern about reliance on earned revenue, worrying 
that “it veers us towards making more commercial decisions in 
artistic programming than we would like and compromises goals 
around accessibility for audiences.”
Private foundations
Private foundations were not major players in the deals 
examined for this study. While foundations provided 
organizations with a range of funding, there were only 
two cases in which private funders provided the same 
foundational levels of support for facility projects as their public 
counterparts. In both cases more than one funder was involved, 
combining resources to meet organizations’ goals to renovate 
and add capacity.
Foundations’ investments in facility projects most often came 
in the form of significant one-time gifts. In four cases funders 
contributed to long-term capitalization by establishing facility 
reserves to fund maintenance. Several funders supported one-
time evaluation and planning work, and others gave significant 
capital campaign gifts. While most organizations received 
smaller (often project-specific) grants annually, this support 
was not as significant and rarely facility-related.
Study participants did not express ambitions to grow 
foundation dollars relative to other opportunities. Some 
participants failed to mention foundations or did so only in 
passing, while others cited competitive funding markets and a 
lack of local foundations as barriers to accessing this support. 
A few participants expressed concern that foundation support 
was often short-term and could not be relied on over time.
Study participants voiced clear hopes that the availability of 
unrestricted support from foundations would increase. The 
executive director of a performing arts center described how 
the organization had to “pretzel itself” to be considered for 
foundation support. Others raised concerns about foundations’ 
focus on new programs and growth even when “we’re 
struggling to provide basic things like electricity.”
Debt
Organizations expressed different philosophies on debt, and 
few used it. Six study participants took on significant debt to 
help cover facility-related costs. Only two of these organizations 
exhibited strong financial health post-acquisition. 
Of this group, four described debt as a tool that helped them 
to renovate and maintain their facilities. These organizations 
took advantage of traditional bank loans and New Market Tax 
Credit opportunities to “get [their buildings] up to minimally 
functional level[s],” cover construction costs that were later 
reimbursed, and fund comprehensive renovations to align their 
spaces with their missions. The leaders who used tax credits 
noted that these debt structures were precarious and complex. 
They explicitly cautioned peers against trying to replicate their 
approaches, one describing how “fully understanding [the 
debt structure] was very difficult…we had a team of nonprofit 
finance experts that worked really hard to understand and 
explain [to everyone else] how it works.” 
A number of leaders who ran debt-free organizations 
expressed that they were uncomfortable with the idea. The 
executive director of a small arts center stated: “one thing we 
are not doing is using debt…debt service would be a big thing 
for an organization our size to carry.” 
In conclusion, although the $1 buildings themselves were 
free, participants recognized in retrospect that $1 building 
acquisition required significant upfront investment and elevated 
the long-term costs of operations. For the many small and mid-
sized organizations in this study the increases in scale were 
especially dramatic, often leading to mismatches in levels of 
responsibility and resources. Organizations employed a variety 
of strategies to cover these costs and capitalize for future 
success. However, they uncovered no clear solution, instead 
describing an array of challenges connected to each of these 
funding strategies. 
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Part IV: The Outcomes of Acquisition
Organizations’ varied experiences funding the costs of $1 
buildings prompt the fundamental question – was it worth 
it? Part IV sheds light on the diverse outcomes organizations 
experienced after taking on $1 buildings. This section examines 
the impacts of facility acquisition on study participants’ 
missions, surrounding communities, and organizations’ 
financial health. It concludes with a summary of characteristics 
that set building recipients up for success. 
Organizations experienced a diversity of outcomes.  
To understand the impacts of acquisition on study participants, 
TDC examined their health along two dimensions: financial 
health and achievement of artistic and programmatic goals. 
Participants’ financial health outcomes were based on their 
months of operating cash and months of unrestricted net 
assets in the fiscal years 2009-2013.9 Assessments of 
artistic and programmatic goal achievement are based on 
organizations’ explanations of their own goals and the self-
described impacts of their work.
Figure 7 captures these outcomes, showing the significant 
range of financial and mission-related results participants 
experienced.10 During the years represented only two of the 17 
organizations were in strong positions of financial health and 
fully achieving their mission-based goals; only three exhibited 
weak financial health and were not achieving their artistic and 
programmatic goals. TDC anecdotally observes a similar range 
of outcomes throughout the wider sector.
Organizations described an array of tangible and 
intangible mission-related benefits connected to $1 
building acquisition. When asked to outline the artistic and 
programmatic impacts of their facilities, participants described 
the following achievements. Some of these outcomes can be 
concretely measured. Others, especially those related to quality 
and community-level impacts, are more subjective  
and anecdotal.
 Increased scale of impact. Performing arts organizations 
self-reported that they grew the size of their audiences by 
increasing the numbers of productions and performances 
offered, and expanding their seating capacity. Moving into 
larger facilities allowed arts education organizations to serve 
more students on a daily basis.
 New offerings. Organizations described many ways in 
which they added to their existing offerings. For most 
organizations, these additions were driven by a mix of 
strategic and opportunistic motivations – “the facility 
dictated what we were able to do with programs just as 
much as programs dictated how we would alter the facility.” 
In some cases, organizations strategically added programs 
to expand the variety of their offerings; for instance, an 
education organization added performing arts classes to its 
visual arts offerings. Other participants cited extraordinarily 
creative uses of space, most of which were inspired by the 
opportunities and limitations of their facilities. A theatre 
covered the seats in its auditorium with a temporary floor, 
turning the space into a dance club – an exercise in “not 
letting the natural configuration pose limits.”
 Enhanced artistic quality. Many of the performing arts 
organizations in this sample spoke with excitement about 
perceived improvements in artistic quality – “[the space] 
brought our art to the next level,” “we now have a space that 
is productive in terms of what we want to use it for,” “the 
facility allowed for better artistic quality and better amenities 
for production.” In a few cases participants expressed 
frustrations about the limitations of their facilities, connecting 
struggles to achieve their missions to space constraints.
 Improved outside perceptions. In some cases, buildings 
helped to change external perceptions of organizations’ 
work. Staff described how facilities came to embody their 
Figure 7. Organizational outcomes 
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9  The indicators TDC uses to gauge overall financial health assess organizations’ liquidity and flexibility – their abilities to maintain operations, cover short- 
and long-term obligations, weather downturns, and take advantage of opportunities to innovate. Study participants exhibiting ‘weak’ financial health had 
negative unrestricted net assets (URNA) and <.5 months of operating cash in FY09-FY13. Organizations with ‘strong’ financial health had >3 months of 
URNA and >3 months of operating cash in the same years.
10  Three study participants are not included in this chart. Two organizations acquired their buildings within the last two years, making assessment of impacts 
over time difficult. The third, a performing arts center, is subsidized by the community development corporation (CDC) of which it is part.
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organizations – “our facility became an expression of the 
art we produce,” “[it] came to represent the values the 
organization stands for.” One museum director commented 
how recent renovations to its facility “completely changed 
the look, feel, attitude, and tone” of the space, and 
subsequently the institution.
 Increased visibility. Leaders described how $1 building 
facilities gave their organizations visible presences in 
surrounding communities. One executive director observed 
that acquiring and renovating the organization’s facility 
“metaphorically and physically turned the light on and 
allowed people to look in.”
Some organizations reported community-level impacts, 
although they were difficult to quantify. By nature of their 
missions, some organizations more easily moved into visible 
community roles, taking advantage of their new positions 
to increase impact at the neighborhood level. These study 
participants offered community programs, events, and free/
discounted spaces for neighborhood use, and reported 
upticks in local engagement. In contrast, participants with less 
community-oriented missions often struggled to take on larger 
presences and to build excitement around their missions with 
local stakeholders.
While study participants tended to prioritize their own 
organizational goals to improve art and scale up programmatic 
impact, some noted progress towards the community-level 
goals that motivated original building owners and funders. A 
few participants believed that their organizations had roles in 
revitalizing communities. The executive director of a community 
theatre commented that “as the theatre grew it drew wealthier, 
older audiences, prompting high-end restaurants to spring 
up nearby.” Some leaders described their organizations as 
civic anchors – “we’re now the headquarters for creativity 
in the neighborhood.” Other organizations recounted how 
$1 building projects united communities by “rallying and 
focusing people on an idea about how to create something of 
value for the community.” The leader of a small community 
arts center described how individuals and businesses across 
the community pitched in with free goods and pro-bono 
services, and kept abreast of progress through local media 
and community events. While these outcomes were difficult 
to measure and at times unintended, they align with funders’ 
goals for arts facilities to drive economic development and 
community revitalization.
Financial health varied across the sample, but 
organizations share anxiety about the future. 
Organizations exhibited a range of financial health outcomes, 
dispelling the occasionally voiced preconception that facilities 
are panaceas. Approximately half of study participants met 
TDC’s criteria for weak financial health. These organizations 
had little to no operating cash, insufficient unrestricted net 
assets to support operations, and no or limited reserves. They 
also struggled to fully fund depreciation. In the worst cases, 
a few organizations had self-described structural deficits and 
broken business models. On the other side of the spectrum, four 
organizations with adequate operating cash and unrestricted 
net assets to support operations met TDC’s criteria for strong 
financial health. Had more organizations taken on facility-related 
debt, financial health outcomes may have been worse.
Almost all participants, regardless of financial health, expressed 
anxiety about their long-term sustainability. Organizations’ 
concerns stemmed from recognition of their diminished 
flexibility post-acquisition and the awareness that “when things 
go downhill you’re stuck with the extra weight of a building.” 
Even well capitalized organizations expressed concerns about 
what lay ahead, acknowledging that changes in funding 
environments and unexpected facility emergencies could have 
significant impacts on their future health. At the same time, 
study participants voiced strong commitments to tap their $1 
buildings’ full potential despite the financial challenges.
Organizations with strong financial health and networks 
of support prior to acquisition were better set up for 
success. This research did not uncover a silver bullet solution 
for how organizations acquiring $1 buildings can achieve 
mission-based goals and financial stability. Organizations 
worked hard to fund their expanded footprints, and 
encountered both success and failure along the way. However, 
study participants’ experiences suggest that exhibiting 
the following characteristics prior to acquisition increases 
organizations’ chances of achieving long-term financial health 
and mission-based success.
 Strong financial health. Looking back, organizations and 
funders cautioned groups that do not meet a basic threshold 
of financial health – “If you can’t post surpluses consistently, 
you should question whether you want to move forward.” 
Organizations that self-reported solid financial health prior to 
acquisition were better prepared to take risks, invest in their 
futures, and absorb the impacts of failed risks on the other 
side. Those with reserve funds in place – facilities reserves 
to fund maintenance and renovations, operating reserves 
to help organizations weather rainy days, and risk and 
innovation reserves to implement and test new ideas – had 
clear sources of funding for maintenance, buffers to mitigate 
risk, and capital to invest in innovation. As one interviewee 
reflected, “there are always costs you don’t expect, so any 
cushion helps.”
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 Networks of support. Arts leaders and funders also 
suggested connections between organizations’ financial 
health and the networks of support they had in place prior to 
acquisition. Older organizations, which tended to have more 
established donor networks, had slightly better financial 
outcomes than their younger counterparts. These groups 
were more likely to have established relationships with loyal 
donors and funders, thereby decreasing their dependence 
on one revenue source and better preparing them to cover 
the elevated costs associated with facility acquisition.
Organizations that funded deferred maintenance in a 
timely manner experienced better mission-based and 
financial outcomes. As Figure 8 shows, study participants 
that addressed deferred maintenance were more likely to 
achieve their artistic and programmatic goals,11 and to a lesser 
degree exhibit strong financial health. Participants noted that 
completing renovation work helped to align their spaces with 
their programmatic needs, contributing to mission-based 
successes: “we finally had a good space for programming 
and performances…the renovations gave us the technical 
capabilities to become a more efficient and workable theatre 
space.” Facilities in good condition also required less 
investment in annual maintenance: “after the renovation 
everything became more manageable and easier to maintain.” 
Lastly, taking care of lingering facility concerns meant that 
organizations could put more funding towards programs, 
infrastructure, and reserves. Study participants that were able 
to fund deferred maintenance expressed relief, one stating “it’s 
so comforting to know that the building is in good shape now – 
we can finally put our money elsewhere.”
In contrast, those that struggled to fund deferred maintenance 
in a timely manner were often forced into undesirable 
situations. Their inability to address annual needs led to 
vicious cycles of built-up deferred maintenance, increasing the 
likelihood of facility-related emergencies and redirecting funds 
and attention from programs and infrastructure. A small theatre 
reflected: “for years after acquisition we were trying to find 
money for the facility rather than for operations and programs.” 
Emergency repairs on run-down buildings led to cash flow 
challenges and/or forced organizations to take on debt, and 
these ad hoc repairs were often hasty and underfunded. The 
artistic director of a mid-sized theatre with an old boiler system 
recalled how “we put a Band-Aid on it and did a quick low-cost 
fix” only to have the entire system break a few months later. 
11  Accumulated deferred maintenance can also be an indicator of poor financial health, demonstrating that organizations are unable to invest in capital 
projects. As a private funder noted, “when an organization is financially struggling, maintenance is often the first thing to go unfunded.”
Figure 8. Organizational outcomes by ability to fund 
deferred maintenance
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Lessons for the Field
While study participants voiced their strong and continued 
commitment to making these deals work, arts leaders also 
expressed anxiety about their organizations’ futures. Facility 
acquisition compelled significant growth and new costs 
associated with professionalization, led to shifts in art and 
audiences, and created funding challenges that span multiple 
generations of leadership. Two thirds of study participants have 
their second or third executive director since acquisition, and 
continue to struggle with questions of how to support their 
facilities and larger footprints. The initial opportunism that 
motivated acquisition has been muted by leaders’ recognition 
that “we are walking a tightrope all the time.” In addition, it is 
unclear whether funders’ and original building owners’ goals 
for broader community impact were achieved.
In light of the many challenges associated with $1 buildings, 
this report asks: how can organizations, funders, and other 
stakeholders assess, prepare for, and structure facility 
opportunities to achieve positive outcomes for arts and cultural 
organizations, funders, and communities?
First and foremost, study participants’ stories demonstrate that 
there is no single formula for success. Organizations employed 
an array of strategies that resulted in a range of outcomes. 
This diversity reaffirms that organizations’ needs are specific 
to time and place and dependent on a variety of factors, and 
that the strategies that set them up for success must be placed 
in greater context. At the same time, these 17 organizations’ 
experiences highlight clear lessons for the many stakeholders 
involved in $1 building deals.
Nonprofit arts and cultural organizations
The first set of recommendations emerged as considerations 
for board and staff leadership assessing $1 building 
opportunities.
 Plan for the full financial and mission implications of 
the $1 building. For the arts and cultural organizations in 
this study, acquiring $1 buildings resembled more traditional 
facilities projects – they were expensive propositions that 
needed rigorous upfront evaluation and planning.  
Study participants also experienced changes in art, 
audiences, community expectations, donor bases, and 
organizational cultures. 
 
Understanding the full costs associated with these deals 
requires organizations to conduct facility assessments, 
business planning, and feasibility studies. Facility 
assessments help organizations determine the extent of 
deferred maintenance present, and to scale the costs of 
upfront renovations as well as annual maintenance and 
operations. They also help organizations determine how 
to use their facilities, ensuring that form follows function. 
Business planning helps organizations to evaluate the 
costs associated with growth and professionalization, 
develop sustainable long-term revenue streams, and plan 
for long-term sustainability. Paired with business planning, 
feasibility studies help organizations to better understand 
the potential for support. In combination, this work provides 
staff and board leadership with a platform to have candid 
conversations about the short- and long-term implications 
of acquisition. It also facilitates conversations between 
organizations and funders about their individual and shared 
goals, and who pays for what. 
 
The challenges of executing planning are that $1 building 
deals are often on quick timelines, and that this work can 
be costly in its own right. In light of the study findings, this 
report posits that the long-term return on investment in 
upfront planning is high. 
 Evaluate readiness. Organizations and funders both noted 
the importance of gauging organizations’ financial health, 
existing networks for support, and readiness to take on 
facilities.
 Structure decision-making to balance opportunistic 
mindsets. Study participants advised organizations to 
carefully select decision-making teams to reflect a variety of 
perspectives, with key members prepared to play the role of 
“devil’s advocate.”
For organizations that decide to move forward with acquisition, 
study participants highlighted the following lessons.
 During the acquisition process, anticipate and plan 
for changes over time. Organizations recommended that, 
wherever possible, it is in organizations’ best interests to 
control as many of the variables associated with acquisition 
as possible. Both organizations and funders recommended 
that arrangements be clarified and codified upfront, and 
that lease agreements be revisited over time to ensure they 
support organizations’ changing needs in the context of 
shifting operating environments.
 Build and maintain lasting relationships with key 
partners. Building and maintaining relationships with 
private and public funders, leaseholders, city leaders, and 
other partners is a critical component of success.
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Community stakeholders
The expectation and potential for broader community impact 
differentiates $1 building projects from other facilities 
projects. In retrospect, study participants recommended that 
organizations, funders, original building owners, and community 
stakeholders engage in transparent discussions about their 
goals for impact and future roles early in the acquisition 
process. In this way, stakeholders can ensure that they share 
ambitions for community-level impact, set realistic expectations 
for different parties’ involvement and investment, and begin 
to develop joint strategies to fund and fulfill these goals over 
time. Early conversations can also help lay the groundwork for 
productive long-term relationships and build broad bases of 
support for these projects.
Funders
Study participants’ experiences suggest the need for funders 
to apply their approaches to traditional facility projects to 
$1 building deals. In doing so, funders can strengthen the 
nonprofit organizations inhabiting these valued spaces and 
thereby their potential for community impact. In addition to 
partaking in the discussions about community-based goals 
described above, the following recommendations emerged for 
funders’ support of $1 buildings. 
 Fund upfront evaluation and planning. Providing support 
for planning fills expertise gaps, and helps staff and board 
leaders to make informed decisions and adequately prepare 
for the changes that come with acquisition.
 Structure deal timelines that align with organizations’ 
planning needs. Funders can help organizations to execute 
critical planning and renovation work by creating application 
and RFP timelines that reflect organizations’ needs. 
 Support capital projects. Providing capital support 
ensures that organizations can take on large-scale 
renovation work in a timely manner.
 Provide long-term support for facilities. Establishing 
facility reserves helps organizations to cover the costs of 
maintenance and renovations over time.
The Kresge Foundation and TDC foresee adoption of these 
recommendations resulting in two potential outcomes. First, 
increased planning will likely lead to fewer decisions to acquire 
$1 buildings. And second, it will also likely lead to stronger 
deals that more fully achieve stakeholders’ desired impacts. As 
arts organizations and funders continue to explore $1 building 
opportunities, it is our hope that stakeholders will use this 
report as a starting point when considering $1 building deals 
to ensure that these opportunities achieve the important goals 
they set out to fulfill.
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